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Missourian Efforts
to Extradite Joseph Smith
and the Ethics of Governor Thomas
Reynolds of Missouri
A. Keith Thompson
Abstract: This is the second of two articles discussing Missouri’s requisitions
to extradite Joseph Smith to face criminal charges and the Prophet’s
recourse to English habeas corpus practice to defend himself. In the first
article, the author discussed the English nature of pre-Civil War habeas
corpus practice in America and the anachronistic modern idea that the
Nauvoo Municipal Court did not have jurisdiction to consider interstate
habeas corpus matters. In this article, he analyzes the conduct of Governor
Thomas Reynolds in the matter of Missouri’s requisitions for the extradition
of Joseph Smith in light of 1840s legal ethics in America. That analysis
follows the discovery that Governor Reynolds had dismissed the underlying
1838 charges against Joseph Smith when he was a Missouri Supreme Court
judge. It also responds to the revelation that Missouri reissued indictments
based on the same underlying facts in June 1843 despite the existence of
a double-jeopardy provision in the Missouri Constitution of 1820.

I

n my earlier article entitled “The Habeas Corpus Protection of Joseph
Smith from Missouri Arrest Warrants,”1 I explained that the steps taken
to protect Joseph Smith from Missouri warrants were both reasonable and
legal when read in their 1840 Illinois context. The criticism regarding the
use of the English writ of habeas corpus to defend Joseph Smith came
1. A. Keith Thompson, “The Habeas Corpus Protection of Joseph Smith from
Missouri Arrest Requisitions,” Interpreter: A Journal of Mormon Scripture 29
(2018): 273–306, http://www.mormoninterpreter.com/..
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from two corners: first, Governor Thomas Ford, who had guaranteed the
Prophet’s safety in transit and while at Carthage and was being blamed by
Smith’s followers for his death, and second, Thomas Sharp, editor of the
Warsaw Signal, who had become an avowed anti-Mormon by late 1841
in large part because he was concerned about “the political power of the
growing number of Mormons in Hancock County” and because the Saints
had overreacted to his criticism of John C. Bennett’s appointment as mayor
of Nauvoo.2 I took time to explain the English habeas corpus practice
followed in the United States before the Civil War because many are apt
to think Ford and Sharp were right in their criticism. It might appear to
21st-century readers that a city court in a frontier town like Nauvoo did
not have the legal authority to invalidate an interstate arrest warrant. That
anachronistic understanding had not yet been rebutted by contemporary
LDS historians, and an understanding of the history of habeas corpus in
America before the Civil War provides the background to do so.
In the course of clarifying that history, I drew attention to a concern
that Jeffrey Walker raised in his research about the conduct of Missouri
Governor Thomas Reynolds. Walker did not press this point home,3
perhaps out of respect to the governor in light of his tragic and premature
death.4 The purpose of this article is to explain Walker’s insight and
take it further, since Andrew Hedges has uncovered more evidence of
Missouri’s continuing conspiracy against the Latter-day Saints after they
were expelled during the so-called “Mormon War” of 1838.5
After he served as the Chief Justice of Illinois, Thomas Reynolds
worked as a Missouri Second Circuit judge before he was elected to
succeed Lilburn W. Boggs as governor of Missouri.6 In his role as
2. Marshall Hamilton, “Thomas Sharp’s Turning Point: Birth of an Anti‑Mormon,”
Sunstone Magazine (October 1989): 21. (https://www.sunstonemagazine.com/pdf/07316-23.pdf).
3. Jeffrey N Walker, “Habeas Corpus in Early Nineteenth-Century
Mormonism, Joseph Smith’s Legal Bulwark for Personal Freedom,” BYU Studies
Quarterly 52, no. 1 (2013), 35, 37.
4. Governor Reynolds committed suicide on February 9, 1844.
5. Andrew H. Hedges, “Extradition, the Mormons, and the Election of 1843,”
Journal of the Illinois State Historical Society 109, no. 2 (Summer 2016): 143n1.
6. Reynolds served as Chief Justice of Illinois from 1822–1825 as representative
and speaker of the Illinois House of Representatives from 1826–1828 and moved to
Missouri around 1829. He also served in that state as a representative and speaker
of the House of Representatives (1832–1834) before serving as a judge of the second
judicial circuit (1837–1840) before his election as Governor in 1840.
“Thomas Reynolds,” People, The Joseph Smith Papers, last updated 2018, http://
www.josephsmithpapers.org/person/thomas-reynolds.
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a Missouri Supreme Court judge, Governor Reynolds had dismissed
the Mormon War charges against Joseph Smith and his colleagues in
August 1839, more than twelve months before he took office as governor
of Missouri in September 1840.7 While that knowledge probably
did not infect his requisition for Joseph Smith’s arrest in connection
with the attempted murder of Governor Boggs, it likely did infect the
various requisitions which Missouri issued for Joseph Smith’s arrest
in connection with the Mormon War charges. Nor is this bad faith act
mitigated by Andrew Hedges’ discovery that a subsequent effort was
made to reissue the Missouri War warrants from a different Missouri
judicial district in 1843,8 despite the existence of a double-jeopardy
provision in the Missouri Constitution of 1820.
Governor Reynolds’ involvement in the requisition for Joseph
Smith’s arrest in connection with the attempted murder of former
Missouri Governor Boggs is also ethically suspect, since an objective
governor arguably would not have issued such a warrant based only on
suspicion expressed in media reports.
I have approached the task of analyzing Governor Thomas Reynolds’
possible bad faith in four parts. First, I summarize the charges and
the extradition attempts that Missouri made against Joseph Smith
in connection with the Mormon War of 1838 and the attempted
assassination of former Governor Boggs in 1842.
Second, I review Governor Reynolds’ personal knowledge of those
facts and of the law and legal ethics that applied to lawyers and judges
during the 1840s in the United States.
In Part III, I discuss the political pressures that might have caused
a governor of Missouri to want to hide the dismissal of the Mormon
War charges against Joseph Smith in August 1839 and then reissue very
similar indictments in 1843.
Finally, in Part IV, I discuss what a reasonable governor who had
held office as both a supreme court judge of one state (Missouri), and as
the chief justice of the supreme court of another state (Illinois), should
have done given his knowledge.
I conclude that Governor Reynolds’ conduct in relation to the
attempted extradition of Joseph Smith to face criminal charges in
Missouri in connection with the Mormon War was unethical and likely
7. Walker, “Habeas Corpus in Early Nineteenth-Century Mormonism,” 34–37,
particularly n94.
8. Andrew H. Hedges, “Thomas Ford and Joseph Smith, 1842–1844,” The
Journal of Mormon History 42, no.4 (October 2016): 106n29.
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calculated to protect Missouri’s reputation against damage caused by
the Latter-day Saints redress petitions in Washington. I also suggest that
the warrants Governor Reynolds issued for Smith’s arrest in connection
with the attempted murder of former governor Boggs were flawed by the
lack of an evidential base and because of his anti-Mormon prejudice;
Governor Reynolds should have declined to issue them.

Part I — Joseph Smith’s Alleged Crimes in Missouri
and Extradition Attempts
When they “escaped” from Missouri custody in 1839 while they
were being transferred to a new trial venue, Joseph Smith and other
Latter‑day Saint leaders became fugitives from Missouri justice on
charges “ranging from arson, burglary and robbery to treason and even
murder” (the “Mormon War charges”).9 These were the charges under
which Joseph Smith had been imprisoned first at Richmond, Missouri,
and then, following an earlier transfer, in Liberty Jail near modern-day
Kansas City. There is debate as to whether these Latter-day Saint leaders
escaped or were unofficially released, but the cause of their departure
from Missouri to Illinois did not negate their position as fugitives from
justice under Missouri law for four months until August 1839, when
then-Judge Thomas Reynolds of the Missouri Supreme Court’s Second
Circuit dismissed all those charges.
The second Missouri warrant for Joseph Smith’s arrest asserted that
he was an accessory before the fact in the attempted murder of former
Governor Lilburn W. Boggs on May 6, 1842 (the “Accessory Before the
Fact charges”). The suggestion that Joseph Smith was complicit in this
attempted murder was spawned by anti-Mormons in Illinois, including
former Nauvoo Mayor John C. Bennett.10
Since I have already discussed these charges in some detail in
my earlier article, I will summarize only the legal problems with the
Missouri extradition requisitions which were premised on these charges.
9. Walker, “Habeas Corpus in Early Nineteenth-Century Mormonism,” 34–37.
The other leaders who escaped with Joseph Smith were Hyrum Smith, Lyman
Wight, Alexander McRae, and Caleb Baldwin. They were en route to the jail in
Boone Country because the assigned judge at Liberty (Judge Thomas Burch) had
been the prosecuting attorney in the preliminary hearing before Judge Austin King
and needed to recuse himself from officiating at the trial.
10. Richard Bushman, Rough Stone Rolling, A Cultural History of Mormonism’s
Founder (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2005), 468.
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The Mormon War Indictments — Legal Problems with the
Warrants and the Underlying Extradition Requisitions
The essential problem with any warrant premised on the Mormon War
charges is that the underlying charges had been dismissed by Judge Thomas
Reynolds in the second judicial district of the Missouri Supreme Court in
August 1839, even though Joseph Smith and his colleagues and counsel
did not know of that dismissal.11 If those dismissals had been disclosed
to either of the Illinois governors who issued warrants based on the 1840
or the 1843 Missouri requisitions, it is unlikely they would have issued
those warrants because they would have been seen in their true light as the
vexatious writs Joseph Smith claimed them to be.
English courts had developed a common-law rule that would allow
them to dismiss indictments deemed invalid or suits premised upon
facts already ruled upon.12 That rule was called the res judicata principle,
literally, “the thing had already been decided.” Because the English
Crown had proven dexterous in making small changes to indictments
to get around the res judicata principle, particularly in the case of
colonial revolutionaries, many of the United States included written
double-jeopardy protections into their state constitutions to prevent
vexatious lawsuits in criminal cases.13 The practice was to interpret those
constitutional provisions liberally to avoid the use of criminal litigation
for the purposes of harassment or persecution by the State.14 The 1818
11. Walker, “Habeas Corpus in Early Nineteenth-Century Mormonism,” 35.
12. See for example, Robert Von Moschzisker, “Res Judicata,” 38 Yale
Law Journal
3 (1929). http://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/cgi/viewcontent.
cgi?article=3328&context=ylj. The principle has earlier origins in Roman law.
13. Jay A Sigler, “A History of Double Jeopardy,” The American Journal of
Legal History, Vol. 7, No. 4, (October 1963): 298–301, https://www.jstor.org/stable/
pdf/844041.pdf?refreqid=excelsior%3A5ce02b96211c915d2b2234fbe5dc927f.
14. See, for example, “Fifth Amendment — Double Jeopardy,” The Journal
of Criminal law and Criminology 66, no. 4, (Northwestern University School of
Law, 1975): 428–35, https://www.jstor.org/stable/1142881?seq=8#page_scan_tab_
contents. In response to a newly amended Criminal Appeals Act, the Supreme
Court found that once jeopardy had attached, “the Constitution bars appeal of
those decisions which would require a second trial to finalize proceedings” (435).
But note also the concern of Ronald Jay Allen, Bard Ferrall, and John Ratnaswamy
in “The Double Jeopardy Clause, Constitutional Interpretation and the Limits of
Formal Logic,” Valparaiso University Law Review 26, no. 1 (1991): 281–310, https://
scholar.valpo.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2138&context=vulr,
that
dual
sovereignty was an illogical exception to the double-jeopardy principle in Heath v
Alabama 474 U.S. 82 (1985).
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and 1820 constitutions of Illinois and Missouri included such provisions.
The Missouri clause said:
That the general, great, and essential principles of liberty and free
government may be recognized and established, we declare …
That no person, after having been once acquitted by one jury,
can, for the same offence, be again put in jeopardy of life or limb,
but if, in any criminal prosecution, the jury be divided in opinion
at the end of the term, the court before which the trial shall be
had, may, in its discretion, discharge the jury, and commit or bail
the accused for trial at the next term of such court.15
The first Missouri requisition to Illinois for Joseph Smith’s arrest
was issued by Governor Boggs as one of his final acts as governor on
September 1, 1840, 16 months after Joseph Smith and his colleagues
had escaped to Illinois. Governor Boggs had obtained certified copies
of the indictments in July 1839, but it is unclear whether he knew they
had been dismissed by Judge Reynolds in August 1839 when he issued
his requisition for Joseph Smith’s arrest 13 months later in September
1840.16 However, it is certain that when Governor Reynolds took
office later that month, he knew the underlying indictments had been
dismissed, making the requisitions invalid under the Missouri State
Constitution because he was the judge who had dismissed them. But
before we consider whether Governor Reynolds had an ethical obligation
to recall his State’s requisition for Joseph Smith’s arrest before it was
carried out on June 5, 1841, it is worth examining Governor Reynolds’
actions following the failure of both the first Mormon War requisition
in Judge Stephen A. Douglas’ courtroom in Monmouth, Illinois, and the
requisition for attempted murder in Judge Nathaniel Pope’s US Circuit
Court in Springfield, Illinois.
Judge Stephen A. Douglas found that Governor Carlin’s warrant to
arrest Joseph Smith was already dead (functus officio) by the time it was
used to arrest Joseph Smith in June 1841, as the officer first assigned
to arrest Joseph Smith had not been able to find him in Nauvoo and
had returned the warrant unfulfilled to the governor. The governor’s
procedural mistake, according to Judge Douglas, was that he had not
issued a new warrant but simply gave the old warrant to a new official
to try and arrest Joseph Smith again. As a result, the question was if
15. 1820 Missouri State Constitution; http://librarytrekker.x10host.com/
MOConstitution/1820Page3.html. Clause 10 of Article XIII endured until 1865.
16. Walker, “Habeas Corpus in Early Nineteenth-Century Mormonism,” 35.
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the whole process had to start again in Missouri, or whether the Illinois
governor could issue a new warrant based on Governor Boggs’ original
requisition. Perhaps because Judge Douglas had also heard abundant
testimony that the warrant was fraudulent, Governor Carlin in Illinois
did not issue a new warrant after Judge Douglas’ decision, which decision
put the ball back in the Missouri governor’s court.
When Governor Reynolds became involved in efforts to extradite
Joseph Smith back to Missouri, there was an allegation that Joseph Smith
was an accessory before the fact in the attempted murder of former
Governor Boggs. But when that extradition attempt failed in Judge Pope’s
US Circuit Court in January 1843 and perhaps because of the noise the
Mormon redress petitions were causing in Washington, Missouri sought
to resurrect the old Mormon War treason charges as the foundation for
a new extradition attempt.17
Since Judge Douglas’ dismissal of the warrant based on the Mormon
War facts responded only to the inadequacy of Governor Carlin’s arrest
warrant in Illinois, Governor Reynolds should have been able to simply
ask the new governor of Illinois, Thomas Ford, to issue a new warrant
premised on the existing unsatisfied requisition. But since Governor
Carlin had not voluntarily taken that step, and since Governor Ford had
been skeptical about Missouri’s requisition for Joseph Smith’s arrest for
the attempted murder of former Governor Boggs even before Judge Pope
ruled it invalid, it appears that Missouri thought it better to start again
with the 1838 Missouri War extradition request.
But Andrew Hedges’ research has shown that Missouri chose not to
simply issue a new requisition premised on the original 1838 indictments
that had been certified by former Governor Boggs in July 1839. Rather,
Missouri chose to issue fresh indictments in a different Missouri judicial
circuit as the foundation for a brand new, third requisition. Absent
additional evidence explaining Missouri’s reason for that course, we
do not know for sure whether the third requisition was issued because
Missouri wished to avoid formally disclosing that the original Boone
County indictments had been dismissed in August 1839 or not. But it
is difficult to discern any other reason for that change. That there was
a change at all demonstrates that Joseph Smith was justified in labelling
this third requisition by Missouri as vexatious. The double-jeopardy
principle written in many state constitutions, including the Missouri
Constitution of 1820, was intended to prevent just such gerrymandering
of criminal charges by government officials. That is, if the underlying
17. Bushman, Rough Stone Rolling, 397, 405.
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facts upon which indictments had been issued were the same facts as
those upon which earlier indictments had been issued, then any new
indictments were constitutionally unsound regardless of where they
were filed and whether they had been tweaked in some way.
Even though Governor Reynolds may not have conceived the idea of
avoiding or hiding the Boone County dismissal of the first indictments,
when he issued the third Missouri requisition for Joseph Smith’s arrest
he was fully aware of the abuse of process involved and its breach of both
res judicata and the constitutional double-jeopardy principle.
The only possible mitigation of that conduct may be found in the
words of the double-jeopardy clause in the 1820 Missouri Constitution
quoted above, but that possibility is a stretch. That interpretation rests
on a technical interpretation of the words regarding double jeopardy, for
although Joseph Smith had not been tried by a jury when Judge Reynolds
dismissed the indictments against him, he had been “put in jeopardy of
life or limb.” But that interpretation ignores the reason double-jeopardy
provisions were included in American state constitutions in the first
place. This gerrymandering by Missouri was exactly the kind of official
mischief that double-jeopardy provisions were designed to prevent.
While this interpretation may enable some historians to dismiss
Governor Reynolds’ official involvement in Missouri’s state persecution
of Joseph Smith as the sophistry of a careful lawyer, a review of the
ethical obligations of a lawyer, particularly one who had held office as
both a supreme court judge and chief justice of a supreme court, suggest
otherwise. Before discussing the ethical considerations involved in the
three Missouri requisitions for Joseph Smith’s arrest, however, I have
briefly identified the reason that the requisition for Joseph Smith’s arrest
and extradition to Missouri in connection with the attempted murder of
Governor Boggs failed, suggesting once more that Missouri’s willingness
to press that requisition, despite its obvious flaws, can be reasonably
interpreted as evidence of persecution of Joseph Smith by the state of
Missouri.

The Attempted Murder of Former Governor Boggs
On May 6, 1842, someone attempted to murder former Missouri
Governor Lilburn W. Boggs by shooting him through a window in his
house while he was reading a newspaper. Though suspicion initially fell
on a man named Tompkins18 because of a tense Missouri Senate election
18. Tompkins was a silversmith alleged to have told others of his intent to kill
Boggs (Monte B. McLaws, “The Attempted Assassination of Missouri’s ex-Governor

Thompson, Missourian Efforts to Extradite Joseph Smith • 315

campaign,19 anti-Mormon newspaper reports implicated Joseph Smith
within two weeks of the attempted murder, and thereafter, other avenues
of inquiry were not pursued. In due course, former Governor Boggs swore
an affidavit attesting his belief that Joseph Smith was an accessory before
the fact in his attempted murder. On the strength of those allegations,
Governor Reynolds addressed a requisition for the extradition of both
Joseph Smith and Orrin Porter Rockwell to Illinois Governor Thomas
Carlin, but both were released following habeas corpus hearings in
Nauvoo. (Because I explained pre-Civil War habeas corpus practice in
detail in my earlier article, I will not belabor those details here.)
While Governor Carlin believed that the Nauvoo Municipal Court
did not have the judicial authority to rule on his warrant and that the
ordinance passed by the Nauvoo City Council exceeded its legislative
authority,20 he did not appeal the Nauvoo decision and relied instead on
the issue of a proclamation offering a reward for the capture and arrest of
Smith and Rockwell.21 When Thomas Ford became governor of Illinois
in November of that year (1842) in company with other prominent
lawyers, he agreed with the suggestion to Joseph Smith’s delegation
that the Boggs’ extradition requisition could be acceptably resolved if
Joseph would voluntarily appear before a clearly independent court in
Springfield.22 Though Governor Ford considered that his predecessor’s
arrest warrant was probably illegal, he was not certain that he had the
legal authority to rescind it.23
The legal problems did not end with Governor Carlin’s arrest warrant.
If the State of Illinois were to defeat Joseph Smith’s habeas corpus
challenge on behalf of Missouri, the Illinois defenders of the warrant
would need to prove both that there was substance to the allegations and
that Joseph Smith had fled Missouri justice in relation to this matter. The
first point of proof would be difficult if a habeas corpus hearing looked
behind the allegations at the substance of the case, but the second problem
was insuperable because Joseph Smith had not been present in Missouri
since April or May 1839. The significance of the first flaw may have been
a matter of legal opinion, though it is likely a former state supreme court
Lilburn W. Boggs,” Missouri Historical Review 60, no. 1 (1965): 50). Tompkins was
acquitted within a week (55).
19. Bushman, Rough Stone Rolling, 468.
20. Walker, “Habeas Corpus in Early Nineteenth-Century Mormonism,” 49–51.
21. Ibid., 52.
22. Ibid., 53–54.
23. Ibid., 53n153.
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justice would have considered that an extradition request based solely on
suspicion could not be maintained. But the second deficiency must have
been obvious to Governor Reynolds as a former supreme court justice.
The question to be addressed is whether it was unethical for him to have
issued a flawed extradition requisition and for Governor Carlin to have
issued an arrest warrant premised upon that.

Part II — Governor Reynolds’ Knowledge of
Missouri Law and Legal Ethics
Legal ethics in the first half of the 19th century were not codified but
were rather a combination of the variable dictates of a lawyer’s personal
conscience and the sense of honor required by his profession.24 The
concept of a lawyer acting as an officer of the court does not appear to
have been defined until 1854.25 However, it still seems inconsistent with
any sense of honor for Governor Reynolds to have concealed the fact
that the underlying Mormon War indictments against Joseph Smith had
been dismissed 13 months before Governor Boggs sought his extradition
from Illinois on those charges. Michael Ariens says that the legal and
ethical duty of a lawyer to zealously represent his client underwent
a transition in the 1830s.26 He explains that transition with a reference to
David Paul Brown’s 1856 statement that there was a world of difference
between a lawyer unknowingly defending an unjust case for a client and
that same lawyer doing so knowingly, however much he might “plate sin
with gold.”27 If Governor Reynolds had revealed that the indictments
against Joseph Smith and his colleagues had been dismissed, it is doubtful
a governor of another state would have issued an arrest warrant based
on those indictments or pursued a warrant that had thus been issued by
mistake but which was still alive.
Richard Bushman has suggested that the reason Missouri pursued
Joseph Smith on the old 1838 charges in 1840 was that the Latter-day
Saints had argued in Washington, DC, that Missouri’s failure to bring
extradition proceedings against Joseph Smith was a tacit admission
that Missouri was culpable and even complicit in the atrocities and
24. Michael Ariens, “Lost and Found: David Hoffman and the History of
American Legal Ethics,” Arkansas Law Review 67 (2014): 571.
25. Ariens, “Lost and Found: David Hoffman and the History of American
Legal Ethics,” 606.
26. Ibid., 598.
27. Ibid.
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destruction of property which were committed against the Mormons.28
One reading of this implication is that Joseph Smith was the author of his
own misfortune in the extradition cases since he had shamed Missouri
by his entreaties in Washington, however unsuccessful those entreaties
may have been. That argument continues that, despite any ethical
duties which Governor Reynolds may have owed the justice system
as a lawyer and judge, he may have felt politically justified in taking
whatever steps he could against Joseph Smith to preserve the honor of
the State of Missouri. However, it remains difficult to understand how
he could have remained mute in the matter of his predecessor’s request
for Joseph Smith’s extradition to Missouri on the strength of charges he
knew had been dismissed.29
But it is more difficult to understand how Governor Reynolds could
have issued a second requisition for Joseph Smith’s arrest in 1843 based on
the Mormon War treason charges, since he had personally dismissed the
underlying indictments even though they had been reissued in a different
judicial district.30 Not only did Governor Reynolds know that the
underlying indictments had been dismissed, he also knew that the Missouri
Constitution of 1820 contained a double-jeopardy provision intended to
prevent someone from facing trial twice on the same underlying charges.31
Perhaps Governor Reynolds justified his action in avoiding the
double-jeopardy provision in the 1820 Missouri Constitution because
that clause could be interpreted to mean that no double jeopardy would
attach unless the accused had been subject to a formal jury trial before
the case against him was dismissed. But that interpretation is doubtful
even by the ethical standards of the 1840s, since the dismissal of a case
that was to be heard by a jury was a legal end to that case.
28. Bushman, Rough Stone Rolling, 397, 405, 505.
29. Walker, “Habeas Corpus in Early Nineteenth-Century Mormonism,”
36n94.
30. Andrew H. Hedges, “Thomas Ford and Joseph Smith, 1842–1844,” The
Journal of Mormon History 42, no.4 (October 2016): 97, 106. While Hedges
acknowledges that the new indictment for treason “amounted to a renewal of the
charges that led to his release in Monmouth two years earlier,” he does not discuss
the double-jeopardy provision in the 1820 Missouri Constitution or the fact that
Governor Reynolds must have known that the charges on which he was issuing an
extradition warrant were an abuse of process. See also Hedges, “Extradition, the
Mormons, and the Election of 1843.”
31. 1820 Missouri State Constitution, Article XIII, Clause 10; http://
librarytrekker.x10host.com/MOConstitution/1820Page3.html.
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The likely reason for Missouri’s decision to reissue indictments
against Joseph Smith for treason and other crimes during the Mormon
War of 1838 was a concern that the Boone County dismissal of the
original indictments in July 1839 might be discovered by Joseph Smith’s
legal team if they relied upon the old charges. But that deceptive logic
does not escape res judicata and double-jeopardy principle. Ironically,
the discovery of the dismissal of the original Boone County indictments
appears to have come about as a consequence of the issue of the third
Missouri requisition by the Daviess County Circuit Court. Indeed, the
words of a new ordinance passed by the Nauvoo City Council when
the new Missouri indictments were discovered show that the third
requisition greatly concerned the Saints because it showed that Missouri
was willing to abuse legal process to pursue Joseph Smith without regard
to underlying legal principle or ethics. The new ordinance says:
Whereas Joseph Smith has been three times arrested and three
times acquitted upon writs founded upon supposed crime or
charges preferred by the State of Missouri; which acquittals
were made from investigations upon writs of Habeas Corpus;
namely, one in the United States Court for the district of
Illinois; one in the Circuit Court of the State of Illinois and
one in the Municipal Court of Nauvoo; and whereas a nolle
prosequi has once been entered in the Courts of Missouri upon
all the cases of Missouri against Joseph Smith and other: and
whereas there appears to be a determined resolution by the
State of Missouri to continue these unjust (Illegible Line) for
the body of General Joseph Smith; and whereas it has become
intolerable to be thus continually harassed and robbed of
our money to defray the expences of these prosecutions; and
whereas, according to the Constitution of Illinois “all men are
born equally free and independent; and have certain inherent
and indefeasible rights; among which are those of enjoying
and defending, life and liberty, and of acquiring, possessing
and protecting property and reputation, and of pursuing their
own happiness;” And whereas it is our bounden duty by all
common means, if possible, to put a stop to such vexatious law
suits and save expense: Therefore
SEC. 1 Be it ordained by the City Council of the city of
Nauvoo, according to the intent and meaning of the Charter
for the ‘benefit and convenience’ of Nauvoo that hereafter, if
any person or persons shall come with process, demand or
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requisition founded upon the aforesaid Missouri difficulties,
to arrest said Joseph Smith, he or they shall be subject to be
arrested by any officer of the city, with or without process,
and tried by the Municipal Court; upon testimony and if
found guilty, sentenced to imprisonment in the city prison for
life, which convict or convicts can only be pardoned by the
Governor with the consent of the Mayor of said city.
SEC. 2. And be it further ordained that the preceding
section, shall apply to the case of every and all persons that
may be arrested, demanded or required, upon any charge
founded in the aforesaid Missouri difficulties.
SEC. 3. And be it further ordained, that the Jury that
makes the presentment, in any case above specified, shall not,
nor either of them, act as Jurors on the final trial, but the trial
shall be conducted according to the fifth and sixth articles of
the amendment to the constitution of the United States.
Passed December 8, 1843.
JOSEPH SMITH, Mayor. L. A.
WILLARD RICHARDS, Recorder.32
While the words of the new Nauvoo municipal ordinance did not
expressly refer to the res judicata and double-jeopardy doctrines, the
ordinance’s reference to Missouri’s nolle prosequi in the preamble made
it clear that Joseph Smith and his legal team knew by December 1843
that the 1838 indictments had been dismissed. Both requisitions based
on the Mormon War charges were vexatious because the underlying
indictments had been dismissed before the requisitions were issued.
And the accessory before the fact requisition was simply unsustainable
because Joseph Smith had not been in Missouri at the time of the
attempted murder.

Part III — Political Pressures on Missouri
Arising Because of the Mormon Redress Petitions
Bushman attributes the idea to present redress petitions in Washington
to Sidney Rigdon. Rigdon wanted “to ask state legislatures for resolutions
in support of the Saints, and then request reparations for the Missouri
32. Nauvoo Neighbor, 13 December 1843. It was described as “an extra
Ordinance for the extra case of Joseph Smith and Others.” This amendment was
passed five days earlier on 8 December 1843.
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losses from Congress,”33 and he had obtained letters of introduction for
that purpose. But ultimately, Joseph Smith, and “Judge” Elias Higbee
bore the weight of the mission to Washington because Rigdon fell ill with
a recurrence of malaria.34 Joseph Smith and Elias Higbee visited President
Martin Van Buren on November 29, 1839, in the company of John Reynolds,
an Illinois congressman who was happy to assist an influential constituent.
Though President Van Buren did not make his famous statement that their
“cause was just but he could do nothing for them” until two months later,
that was the spirit of his response from the outset. The President faced an
election the following year, and he did not wish to disturb Missouri, which
had been one of his strongholds in 1836.35
Joseph Smith and Elias Higbee were better received by Illinois’
congressmen and senators, who heard them in a committee room of
the Capitol and arranged for them to make a presentation to Congress.
But the discussion and result there was not a lot different than it had
been with President Van Buren. One congressman even repeated the
president’s view that the Latter-day Saints should take their redress
petitions to the Missouri court, although others recognized that would
not work.36 Ultimately, Senator Richard Young from Illinois offered to
present the collected Latter-day Saint petitions to the Senate.37
While modern Latter-day Saints are apt to think that the general
response in Washington was indicative of general antipathy toward any
minority sect in the United States, particularly at a time when a new
presidential election campaign was about to begin, that interpretation
treats the politicians and the president a little unfairly.38 The new republic
33. Bushman, Rough Stone Rolling, 391.
34. Ibid.
35. Ibid., 393.
36. Ibid. There were 678 redress petitions in total, and the claims made ranged
from 63 cents to $505,000 for a total of approximately $2 million. See also Clark
V. Johnson, ed, Mormon Redress Petitions: Documents of the 1833-1838 Missouri
Conflict, Vol 16, Religious Studies Center Monograph Series, Bookcraft, Inc. 1992,
https://rsc.byu.edu/out-print/ mormon-redress-petitions-documents-1833-1838missouri-conflict.
37. Ibid., 393–94.
38. Bushman says that “[c]ommentators have overemphasized the relevance of
states’ rights doctrine in tying Van Buren’s hands” since the Saints were asking
for compensation rather than intervention. He says that “states’ rights was
a background issue” (Bushman, Rough Stone Rolling, 638n20). But Bushman
himself ignores the practical question of where such compensation would come
from if not from Missouri, and compensation could only be justified if the Saints’
claims were upheld against Missouri in a full and fair hearing.
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and its Constitution were barely 50 years old, and the federal government
did not yet have the power to hold the states to the letter of the Federal
Constitution, much less to the religion clauses in the First Amendment.
That federal power did not begin to be recognized until after the post‑Civil
War reconstruction nearly 30 years later, when the Fourteenth Amendment
began to make the Bill of Rights’ protections binding upon the states. Even
those reforms did not offer minority religion any practical protection until
the Jehovah’s Witnesses began to make some headway in the US Supreme
Court during the Second World War.39
After these initial meetings in November 1839, the Prophet preached
to congregations in the eastern states and returned to Washington at
the end of January 1840. Then he and Higbee worked with sympathetic
Illinois senators and congressmen to polish the combined petition for
presentation before the senate judiciary committee to which it had
been referred.40 The Missourians were invited to attend, since their
State was accused, and they responded by replaying the script from
Judge Austin King’s initial hearings at the end of the Mormon War in
November 1838. That script maintained that the Saints had been the
aggressors, the action taken was necessary for the defense of the peace,
and that the Mormons did whatever their Prophet told them regardless
of the law of the land, and there was no reasoning with them.
The senate judiciary committee could not resolve the matter because
they lacked the tools to do so, and they did not have the resources or
the time to conduct a full investigation. The senate judiciary committee
retreated to the position that the Prophet and Judge Higbee had been
told from the beginning in their meeting with the President: that the
matter could only be dealt with in the Missouri courts. Higbee stayed
on in Washington until the Senate accepted that recommendation on
March 23, 1840, and the Saints ignored the recommendation because
they considered it futile. Higbee wrote to Joseph Smith that the mission
for redress in Washington had failed.41 However, he and Joseph Smith
had argued that Missouri’s failure to follow up the escapes of early 1839
with extradition requests demonstrated that the Missourians did not
think they could succeed in court because their position was unjust42 and
that many other politicians and officials had considered that the Latter39. See Cantwell v Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940) and West Virginia Board of
Education v Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
40. The hearing took place between February 20 and 22, 1840.
41. Bushman, Rough Stone Rolling, 397.
42. Ibid., 397, 405, 505.
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day Saints had been poorly dealt with. The result of this experience was
that however much the doctrine of the Mormons was maligned in the
press afterward, they were ever afterward “a persecuted minority who
had suffered unjustly for their religious beliefs.”43
So why did Governor Reynolds wait until 1843 to issue his own
version of Governor Boggs’ 1840 requisition for the arrest of Joseph
Smith in connection with the Mormon War charges? Probably because
he believed that Joseph Smith was implicated in the attempted murder
of Boggs and had escaped those charges because of technicalities. He
probably also harbored some residual anger that his state’s reputation
had been sullied nationally by the Mormon arguments in Washington
that continued in the press afterwards. In that context, a non-lawyer
governor might have felt that a further requisition was justified since
Smith had used the law to avoid justice. But Reynolds was a lawyer with
continuing ethical obligations of justice and honesty.

Part IV — What Governor Reynolds Should Have Done
Given What He Knew
If Governor Reynolds suspected that Joseph Smith was complicit in the
murder of Governor Boggs, then he had a variety of choices. None of them
were very appealing, though that remains the nature of the enforcement
of criminal law to this day. He could have instructed state officers to
investigate further, although that would likely not have accomplished
much against Joseph Smith, since Orrin Porter Rockwell was taken before
a grand jury in Independence, Missouri, but not indicted for the attempted
murder of Boggs.44 The gathering of additional material confirming that
Joseph Smith had prophesied Boggs’ death within a year did not have the
potential to prove Joseph Smith’s complicity in attempted murder beyond
reasonable doubt and accordingly would have been a fruitless exercise.
That Tompkins was also charged, tried, and acquitted within a week45
suggests either that the investigation in that matter was substandard or
that the investigators had already left no stone unturned.
But the legitimate options for criminal process against Joseph Smith in
connection with the Mormon War were even more limited. That is, unless
a credible account of Joseph Smith’s personal involvement in some criminal
atrocity that had not been alleged in the original 1838 indictments came to
43. Ibid., 398.
44. Walker, “Habeas Corpus in Early Nineteenth-Century Mormonism,”
47n129.
45. Ibid., 45n123.
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light, the governor’s hands were legally tied if he chose to be law-obedient
and to signal law-obedience to his staff and other officials in the State
of Missouri. Anything more than that amounted to state harassment or
persecution, since Joseph Smith had been indicted, arrested, incarcerated,
and otherwise subjected to criminal process for months in respect to those
same matters before the state decided to dismiss those charges of its own
volition. The prospect of a credible account of uncharged crime against
Joseph Smith coming to light was negligible because nothing else had come
to light despite his unpopularity. The scrutiny which his life attracted ever
since confirms that there was nothing new and damning against Joseph
Smith that could be discovered.
The result was that Governor Reynolds could legitimately defend
the reputation of the State of Missouri only in the press; allegations of
atrocities against the Mormons could be met with printed rebuttals
of the charges, descriptions of the evil the Mormons had done, and
denigrations of their faith. There was plenty of anti-Mormon material
available, and with time, many newspaper editors obliged.
While much of the damage that was the subject of the Mormon
reparation petitions in Washington was personal to individual Latter‑day
Saints, Governor Reynolds’ personal involvement suggests it was reasonable
to attribute much of the Mormon losses to the State of Missouri; the
extermination order remained in place, and the state did not use its militia
resources to protect the saints nor to return and protect their property.

Conclusion
In my earlier article, I explained that Joseph Smith’s use of habeas corpus
practice was legally and morally unobjectionable, despite the contrary
claims of his detractors. In this article, I have shown that Governor
Reynolds of Missouri knew that all the Mormon War charges against
Joseph Smith had been dismissed, yet he not only allowed his State’s
unfounded 1840 requisition for Joseph Smith’s extradition to remain in
place, but he issued a new requisition for Joseph Smith’s extradition on
the strength of contrived new indictments. That is abuse of process which
amounts to official state persecution of an innocent man who had been
released because the prosecutor had abandoned a case he could not prove.
Governor Reynolds’ involvement in the requisition for Joseph Smith’s
arrest on suspicion of complicity in the murder of former Governor Boggs
is less objectionable on legal and ethical grounds, as there is no suggestion
from available records that Governor Reynolds knew those allegations
were contrived. But as a former chief justice of the Illinois Supreme Court,
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it is likely he recognized how thin the underlying case was. In the context
of Missouri’s obsession with the persecution of Joseph Smith and his
followers, he should have paused before adding his personal imprimatur
to the interstate pursuit of Joseph Smith on those charges.
While legal ethics on the frontier were still developing, Governor
Thomas Reynolds’ involvement in requisitions for the arrest and
extradition of Joseph Smith to face contrived charges was dishonorable
from start to finish.
A. Keith Thompson, LLB (Hons); M Jur; PhD is an associate professor
and the associate dean at the University of Notre Dame Australia School
of Law, Sydney. He also practices commercial and property law in New
South Wales and Victoria, Australia. He formerly served 20 years as
International Legal Counsel for the Church in the Pacific and Africa
Areas and has also served in the Church as bishop, stake president, and
mission president. He and his wife, Anita, have eight children and twelve
grandchild.`

